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COMMENT
The Punctilio of an Honor the Most "Cents"-itive:' Trustees,
Broker-Dealers, and North Carolina's Self-Dealing Ban

INTRODUCTION

In 1939, the State of North Carolina imposed a statutory ban on
trustee self-dealing The legislation, based upon the Uniform Trusts
Act (UTA),3 modified state common law4 and set North Carolina
apart from most other states5 by removing the settlor's and
beneficiaries' power to permit the trustee to self-deal and vesting it
solely in the courts.6 This self-dealing prohibition has provided a
strong statement of North Carolina's tradition of protecting the
interests of its beneficiaries. 7 But the current legal and economic
climate is prompting experts to question the efficiency and usefulness
of the ban8 and courts to work hard to avoid its application. 9
Widespread availability of financial information and the rise in the
numbers and activities of individual investors, 10 the emergence of the
trust as a popular method of asset management," and the increased
affiliation 12 of trust institutions and broker-dealers 3 have resulted in
1. The title is a play on Justice Cardozo's famous words describing the trustee's
fiduciary duty. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928).
2. Act of Mar. 28, 1939, ch. 197, sec. 5, 1939 N.C. Sess. Laws 445, 446 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-66 (1999) (prohibiting a trustee from buying or
selling to self), 36A-78 (1999) (indicating that the settlor may not relieve the trustee of
liability for self-dealing), 36A-79 (1999) (indicating that the beneficiary may not
prospectively relieve the trustee of liability for self-dealing), § 36A-80 (1999) (empowering
the court to relieve the trustee of liability for self-dealing)); infra notes 66-74 and
accompanying text.
3. See UNiF. TRUST ACr, 7B U.L.A. 763 (1985).
4. See infra notes 40-65 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 33-65 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 217-41 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 152-91 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 117-19 and 195-201 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
12. This Comment adopts the definition of "affiliate" given in chapter 36A, article 5
of the North Carolina General Statutes. Thus, a trustee's affiliate is any person who (1)
directly or indirectly controls or is controlled by the trustee; (2) is under direct or indirect
common control with the trustee; or (3) has an express or implied agreement with the
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conditions that might make the existence of a rigid self-dealing ban
appear unnecessary.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL),' 4 the author of the UTA, recently approved and
recommended for enactment new model legislation-the Uniform
Trust Code (UTC)'--that, if adopted by North Carolina, would
significantly relax the state's self-dealing prohibition. The UTC
removes the UTA's prohibition against trustee self-dealing and allows
either the settlor 6 or the beneficiary 17 to permit self-dealing, so long
as the trustee acts in good faith and treats the beneficiary fairly."
This approach is considerably less restrictive than North Carolina's

trustee regarding the purchase of trust investments by each from 'the other, directly or
indirectly, except through a broker or stock exchange. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-60(1)
(1999).
It is important to note that a broker is excluded from the definition of "affiliate"
in the context of those persons with whom the trustee has agreements to trade and not in
the context of those who are affiliated by way of control. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A60(1) (1999). The term "broker," while not statutorily defined within Article 5, has a
definition in other places similar to this Comment's working definition of "broker-dealer."
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33A-1(3) (1999) (defining "broker" under Uniform Transfers to
Minors Act); infra note 13 (defining "broker-dealer" for purposes of this Comment).
Thus, whether the statute contemplates excepting only those who are acting for the
account of others or includes those acting as dealers for their own account, the exemption
of a broker from the definition of affiliate does not apply when the broker and the trustee
are related by control.
13. This Comment uses the term "broker-dealer" to mean an entity that is in the
business of buying and selling securities issued by others. When acting solely as an
intermediary between buyer and seller, the broker-dealer is trading as a broker. When
acting as the buyer or seller and trading for its own account, the broker-dealer is trading as
a dealer. See infranotes 103-06 and accompanying text.
14. The NCCUSL promotes interstate uniformity in the law by drafting model
legislation and then encouraging states to enact it. See 7B U.L.A. IV (1985); JOHN TRAIN
& THOMAS A. MELFE, INVESTING AND MANAGING TRUSTS UNDER THE NEW PRUDENT
INVESTOR RULE: A GUIDE FOR TRUSTEES, INVESTMENT ADVISORS, AND LAWYERS 29
(1999) (stating that the NCCUSL's "charter is to promote uniformity among the fifty
states in certain areas of the law").
15. UNIF. TRUST CODE (2000). In 1993, the NCCUSL began the process of drafting
the UTC, a comprehensive body of legislation that would address all aspects of trust law.
See Prefatory Note, UNIF. TRUST Acr (October 1999 Draft).
16. The settlor must give his permission explicitly in the trust instrument. See infra
notes 140-41 and accompanying text. The settlor, also often called the trustor, the
grantor, or, in the case of a trust established by a will, the testator, is the person who
creates the trust by transfering legal ownership of her property to a trustee and directing
the trustee to hold and manage the property for the benefit of another. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

§§ 3(1), 17 (1959).

17. The beneficiary can permit the transaction by giving informed consent prior to the
transaction, by ratifying the transaction afterward, or by simply failing to pursue his claim
before the statute of limitations runs. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(b)(4), (5) (2000).
18. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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statutory ban 19 and more closely mirrors the law in other
jurisdictions0 Adoption of the UTC by the General Assembly would
severely weaken the protection North Carolina law has historically
given to trust beneficiaries.'
This Comment addresses the current legal and practical status of
trustee self-dealing in North Carolina and the possible repercussions
of any modifications. Part I introduces the basic concepts of trustee

self-dealing jurisprudence and discusses the historical treatment of
self-dealing trustees in North Carolina courts prior to the passage of
the UTAY2 Part I also examines the general common law rules,
exceptions to the common law, and the remedies available to injured
beneficiaries? 3 Part II explains the UTA, the legislative intent behind

its passage, and the scope of its ban on self-dealing.

Part II

concludes by discussing the effects of the ban on modem trust

administration.'

Part III details UTC provisions relevant to trustee

self-dealing and contrasts the UTA's position on trustee self-dealing

with that of the UTC. 26 Part IV considers the advantages and
disadvantages of the various ways the North Carolina legislature may
respond to the divergence of trust law from trust practice. 7 The
Conclusion submits a recommendation designed to maximize
protection of the beneficiaries while minimizing trustee

inconvenience.'
I. NORTH CAROLINA'S COMMON LAW TREATMENT OF SELFDEALING TRUSTEES PRIOR TO THE UNIFORM TRUST ACT
A trustee 9 is a fiduciary 3 who holds legal title to property and
19. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 254-70 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 29-64 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 66-128 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 107-28 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 130-47 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 148-250 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 251-75 and accompanying text.
29. As used in this Comment, the word "trust" means an express, non-charitable trust,
the word "trustee" refers only to the trustee of an express, non-charitable trust, and "selfdealing" is the action described and forbidden by section 36A-66 of the North Carolina
General Statutes. See infra note 74 for a brief explanation of the text of that statute.
30. North Carolina courts consider a fiduciary to be one in whom a special confidence
has been placed such that she is bound "in equity and good conscience ... to act in good
faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence." Abbitt v.
Gregory, 201 N.C. 577, 598, 160 S.E. 896, 906 (1931). See generally Gregory S. Alexander,
Essay:

A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 COR.NELL L. REV. 767

1968

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

manages the property for the benefit of another, the beneficiary. 1
North Carolina law allows both individuals and corporations to act as
trustees. 2 Regardless of its form, a trustee owes its beneficiaries a
duty of loyalty, 33 which in North Carolina, as in most jurisdictions, a'
includes administering the trust "'solely in the interest of " those
beneficiaries.35 Situations where the interests of the trustee and
beneficiaries conflict present the trustee with opportunities to breach
its duty of loyalty3 6 and abuse the beneficiaries' confidence. The
(discussing the effect of the judiciary's treatment of fiduciary relationships on fiduciaries
and their beneficiaries).
31. The term "beneficiary" has not been precisely defined by North Carolina courts.
Relying on the "persuasive authority" of the Uniform Probate Code, however, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals suggested it might define a beneficiary as "including 'a person
who has present or future interest, vested or contingent' in the trust property." Taylor v.
Nationsbank Corp., 125 N.C. App. 515, 518, 481 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1997) (quoting UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 1-201(3) (revised 1990), 7B U.L.A. 33 (1996)).
32. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-60(5) (1999) (defining "trustee" to include a
"corporate as well as a natural person"). Although this Comment primarily addresses the
issues surrounding corporate trustees with broker-dealer affiliates, most of the principles
discussed are applicable to other trustees as well.
33. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 711, 153 S.E.2d 449,
457 (1967) ("It is universally recognized that one of the most fundamental duties of the
trustee throughout the trust relationship is to maintain complete loyalty to the interests of
his cestui que trust.").
34. See, e.g., In re Trust of Wickman, 289 So. 2d 788,790 (Fla. App. 1974); In re Estate
of Campbell, 36 Haw. 631, 653 (1944); Schildberg v. Schildberg, 461 N.W.2d 186, 192
(Iowa 1990); Albritton v. Albritton, 622 So. 2d 709, 713 (La. App. 1993); Board of
Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Mayor & City Council, 562 A.2d 720,738 (Md.
App. 1989); In re Krause Estate, 172 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Mich. App. 1969); Bryan v. Holzer,
589 So. 2d 648, 657 (Miss. 1991); Masterson v. Department of Social Services, No. 72204,
1997 Mo. App. LEXIS 1753, at *12 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1997); Refshause v. Sesostris
Temple Ancient, 298 N.W. 755, 781-82 (Neb. 1941); Warehime v. Warehime, 722 A.2d
1060, 1064 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1998); Fire Baptized Holiness Church of God of the Americas v.
Greater Fuller Tabernacle Fire Baptized Holiness Church, 475 S.E.2d 767, 770 (S.C. App.
1996); Wilters v. Wettestad, 510 N.W.2d 676, 680 (S.D. 1994); Slay v. Burnett Trust, 187
S.W.2d 377, 387-88 (Tx. 1945); Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1988); In re
Estate of Vance, 522 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Wash. App. 1974); Estate of Van Epps v. City Bank
of Portage, 161 N.W.2d 278,282 (Wis. 1968).
35. Wachovia Bank & Trust, 269 N.C. at 714, 153 S.E.2d at 459 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959)); Wittkowsky v. Baruch, 127 N.C.
313,318,37 S.E. 449,450 (1900); McEachern v. Stewart, 114 N.C. 370,371, 19 S.E. 702,703
(1894) (quoting North Carolina R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 81 N.C. 223, 230 (1879)) ("The law
frowns upon any act on the part of a fiduciary which places interest in antagonism to duty,
or tends to that result."); In re Trust Under Will of Jacobs, 91 N.C. App. 138, 143, 370
S.E.2d 860, 864 (1988); see also ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TRUSTS 80

(6th ed. 1977) ("A trustee is a fiduciary and he must display throughout the administration
of the trust complete loyalty to the interests of the beneficiary.").
36. If a conflict of interest arises in the administration of the trust, a trustee's failure
to either remove the conflict or resign his position can constitute a breach of the duty of
loyalty. See In reJacobs, 91 N.C. App. at 143, 370 S.E.2d at 864.
37. See Boyd v. Hawkins, 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 195, 207 (1832) (stating that self-
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conflict of interest that arises when a trustee self-deals, while only one
of many possible types of conflicts between the trustee and the

beneficiary,3 8 offers perhaps the greatest potential for abuse.

9

Prior to 1939, North Carolina courts relied on the common law
rules of equity to deal with disloyal trustees ° Those rules disallowed
self-dealing transactions unless the trustee obtained the informed

consent of the beneficiaries4 ' or, after notice to the beneficiaries,
acquired court approval.42 If the requisite authorization was not
attained, the trustee was held liable for the transaction.4 3 The courts

used the "no further inquiry" rule to assess liability once a charge of
self-dealing was made. 4 Upon satisfactory proof that self-dealing had
dealing "exposes [the trustee] to temptation and the cestui que trustto imposition").
38. Conflicts of interest not involving violations of the self-dealing prohibition include
situations in which a corporate trustee purchases its own stock (from a third party) for the
trust, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmt. n (1959), when a trustee
competes with the trust for an investment opportunity, see id. at § 170(1) cmt. k, and when
a trustee votes stock held in trust for his own benefit, see id at § 170(1) cmt. o.
39. A self-dealing transaction creates a high potential for abuse because the trustee's
duty to get the best price for the trust is in direct opposition to its interest in getting the
best price for itself. Furthermore, as both buyer and seller, the trustee has complete
control over the transaction and thus the trustee can set its own price and terms.
40. See McEachern, 114 N.C. at 371, 19 S.E. at 703 (holding that a trustee who uses a
trust to benefit himself violates a rule of equity); Gibson v. Barbour, 100 N.C. 192, 197, 6
S.E. 766, 768 (1888) (indicating that the rule against self-dealing is an equitable rule);
Bruner v. Threadgill, 88 N.C. 361, 367 (1883) ("That the ... trustee cannot purchase the
trust property at his own sale ... is too well settled by authority to admit of argument
.... "); Froneberger v. Lewis, 79 N.C. 426, 428-33 (1878) (citing case law prohibiting a
trustee from purchasing the items offered at her own sale); see also FRANK C. MCKINNEY,
TRUST INVESTMENTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 356-58 (2d ed. 1927) (indicating no
statutory provisions in 1927 dealing with investments by trust companies).
41. See Froneberger,79 N.C. at 436; LEE, supra note 35, at 81 ("A sale of the trust
property to the trustee individually cannot be set aside by a beneficiary who has consented
to the transaction.").
42. See McEachern, 114 N.C. at 372, 19 S.E. at 703. The logic of allowing the
transaction once full disclosure had been made and approval obtained from the
beneficiaries is apparent. If the beneficiaries knew all the details and still approved of the
transaction, then the court should defer to their judgment. If the trustee did not make full
disclosure or did not obtain the permission of the beneficiaries, the court could presume
that such permission would not have been given in light of all the facts.
43. See iL at 373, 19 S.E. at 703 (stating that the equitable rights of the beneficiaries
cannot be defeated by the trustee without full disclosure and consent).
44. The rule, as explained by the Court of Appeals of New York, dictates that "[t]he
law 'does not stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction was fair or unfair. It
stops the inquiry when the relation is disclosed ... without undertaking to deal with the
question of abstract justice in the particular case.' " Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304
(N.Y. 1926) (quoting Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva, & Coming R.R. Co., 8 N.E. 355, 358
(N.Y. 1886)). Although no North Carolina cases use the phrase "no further inquiry,"
North Carolina clearly follows this rule. See, e.g., McEachern, 114 N.C. at 371, 19 S.E. at
703 ("The fact that in making such investment [the trustee] was free from any actual
fraudulent purpose is immaterial ... ").
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occurred, the beneficiaries had a right to void the transaction,4 5 to

receive from the trustee the full value of the property sold,46 and to
remove the individual as trustee.4 7

Under the common law, liability for self-dealing could linger long
after the transaction was completed. In Ryden v. Jones,48an executor,
was found liable to the0
treated by the Ryden court as a trustee,
49
complaining beneficiaries twenty years after purchasing property
from the trust." The court voided the sale, holding that the passage
of time did not operate to bar the action because the trustee had yet
to distribute the funds from the sale; thus, the trust was still open and
unexecuted even though several years had passed since the sale was
completed. 2
Relying on the principle that equity is concerned with the
substance of a transaction rather than its form, 3 North Carolina
courts also upheld the prohibition against self-dealing after finding
that a trustee sought to disguise the nature of the transaction. For
instance, in Bruner v. Threadgill,5 the trustee made an agreement to
sell trust property to a third party.55 Under the agreement, the third
party promised to reconvey the property to the trustee.56 Despite the
form of the transaction, the court found the trustee liable for selfdealing.57

A trustee who obtained court approval for a self-dealing
transaction was not insulated from liability if such approval was
45. See Roberts v. Roberts, 65 N.C. 27,28 (1871).
46. See Hunt v. Bass, 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 292,297 (1832).
47. See North Carolina R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 81 N.C. 223,230-34 (1879).
48. 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 497 (1821).
49. See id. at 499.
50. The property at issue was a black slave named Frank. See iL at 497. In 1794,
Frank was sold at a public auction by the executor of the estate of the petitioner's uncle.
See id. at 499. The executor used an agent to purchase Frank for himself at the sale for full
value. See id The court found that even though the sale was "fair and necessary" and "all
the persons entitled to distribution in the negro assented to the sale," the executor was
liable for the sale. Id. The court reasoned that the executor, who by statute did not have
the power of sale without approval by the court, should be subject to the same rules as
trustees with regard to self-dealing. See id. at 505.
51. See id. at 505.
52. See id.
53. See Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N.C. 577,593, 160 S.E. 896,904 (1931).
54. 88 N.C. 361 (1883).
55. See id. at 363. The decedent Bruner had conveyed real property to a creditor by a
deed of mortgage in order to secure several notes. After defaulting on the notes, Bruner
assented to the sale of the property. The creditor arranged for the auctioneer to purchase
the property at the sale and to then resell it to him. See id.
56. See id
57. See id. at 367.
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premised on inadequate or misleading disclosures. For example, in
Patton v. Thompson,5 8 the trustee petitioned the court to sell some of

the trust property so that he could provide for the beneficiary. 9
Although the trustee had obtained the permission of the Orange
County Court of Equity to make the sale, the North Carolina
Supreme Court voided the sale because the trustee had not disclosed
that the purchaser was acting as the trustee's agent.6

The reasoning behind North Carolina's strong disapproval of
trustee self-dealing was explained repeatedly in these early cases.61
The trustee had a duty to operate the trust in the best interest of the
beneficiaries.6 2 The trustee necessarily injected his own interests into

the transaction by dealing with the trust on his own behalf. Thus, the
trustee would be tempted to defraud the beneficiaries by putting his
own interests ahead of those of the beneficiaries without their
knowledge or consent.6 The common law rules sought to avoid this
temptation by prohibiting self-dealing without full disclosure and the
permission of the beneficiaries or the court.64 North Carolina's rule
of strict liability for violation of the prohibition was not only intended
to serve as a deterrent for the trustee, but also to keep the courts free
from time-consuming litigation over the fairness of self-dealing

transactions.65
II. THE UNIFORM TRUST ACT'S RESPONSE TO SELF-DEALING AND
ITS EFFECT ON MODERN TRUST ADMINISTRATION

In 1937, the NCCUSLI adopted the UTA.67 Self-dealing, as a
violation of the trustee's duty of loyalty, was one of the many issues6l
58. 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 285 (1855).
59. See id. at 286.
60. See i at 288-89.
61. See McEachern v. Stewart, 114 N.C. 370, 371, 19 S.E. 702, 703 (1894); Gibson v.
Barbour, 100 N.C. 192, 197, 6 S.E. 766,768 (1888); Bruner, 88 N.C. at 367; Froneberger v.
Lewis, 79 N.C. 426,430 (1878); Patton,55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) at 288.
62. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
64. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 711-12, 153 S.E.2d
449,457-58 (1967).
65. See Gordon v. Finlay, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 239, 242 (1824) (indicating that "[t]o
make exceptions from the rule in particular cases, upon the ground that full value was paid
would produce litigation").
66. See supra note 14 (explaining the purpose of the NCCUSL).
67. See UNIF. TRUSTS ACt prefatory note, 7B U.L.A. 763 (1985).
68. The UTA also addresses securities held as trust property and the liability of the
trustee to third parties. See UNIF. TRUSTS Acr § 8, 7B U.L.A. 778 (1985) (permitting a
trustee to vote corporate stock by proxy); id.§ 9, 7B U.L.A. 779 (permitting a trustee to
hold corporate stock in the name of a nominee); id § 12, 7B U.L.A. 781 (allowing contract
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addressed by the Act. 69 One of the main purposes of the Act was to
"clarify and tighten the rules regarding loyalty by a trustee to the
interests of his beneficiary."7 North Carolina adopted the UTA in
1939 with only minor modifications to the NCCUSL's model
legislation.'
In so doing, the North Carolina General Assembly
expressed its approval of the goals of the Act and signaled that it
sought to hold trustees to a standard even more rigorous than that
applied under the common law.72
North Carolina's version of the UTA 73 flatly prohibits the trustee
suits against the trustee at law if the contract was within the power of the trustee to make);
id.§ 14, 7B U.L.A. 785 (allowing tort actions against the trustee in his representative
capacity).
69. See UNIF. TRUSTS Acr § 5, 7B U.L.A. 774 (1985) (prohibiting the trustee's sale or
purchase of trust property from or to itself or an affiliate).
70. UNIF. TRUSTS ACT prefatory note, 7B U.L.A. 763 (1985). "It is felt that many of
the abuses of modern trust administration have come from indirect disloyalty of the
trustee and that a clear statement of the full implications of the loyalty duty might help in
securing honest administration." Id. at 765. The Act was also designed to abolish
"obsolete and unjust rules of trust law" and to facilitate the administration of trusts by
easing some of the rules of equity. Id. at 763.
71. See JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 829 (1939 Regular Session); JOURNAL
OF THE SENATE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 605
(1939 Regular Session). The General Assembly added several provisions not included in
the NCCUSL's version of the Act. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-63 (1999) (regulating
the conditions under which a bank may hold trust funds while awaiting investment or
distribution); § 36A-64 (allowing the trustee to make loans to the trust if the transaction is
fair); § 36A-65 (permitting the trustee to loan funds from one trust to another). The UTA
is now codified as Chapter 36A, .Article 5 of the North Carolina General Statutes. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-60 to 36A-85 (1999).
72. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 714, 153 S.E.2d 449,
459 (1967) (stating that the purpose of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-66 (then codified as § 3628) is to clarify and strengthen the trustee loyalty rules). Interestingly, the North Carolina
General Assembly does not impose the same statutory prohibition against self-dealing on
estate administrators. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A (1999) (addressing the
administration of decedents' estates). Chapter 28A does not prohibit testators from
granting the power to self-deal to the personal representative of their estate. See id. The
differing treatment of personal representatives and trustees of express trusts perhaps is
due to the court's more substantive oversight of probate matters. In North Carolina, a
personal representative is supervised by and must account to the court annually. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-21-1 (1999). In contrast, a trustee really answers only to the
beneficiaries; the court does not inquire into the management of the trust unless the
beneficiaries or their representatives sue the trustee or the trustee herself petitions the
court for instructions. See LEE, supra note 35, at 129. Thus, although both the personal
representative and the trustee are fiduciaries, the lack of judicial oversight may have led
the legislature to adopt stricter rules for trustee behavior. Cf.Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 825 (1983) ("The extent of fiduciary duty varies with the
degree of potential abuse of power stemming from the relation.").
73. The relevant sections are codified in sections 36A-66, 36A-78, 36A-79, and 36A-80
of the North Carolina General Statutes.
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and its corporate affiliates from buying property from the trust or

selling property to the trust without prior court approval. 7 4 Thus,
even if the settlor desires that the trustee be allowed to purchase trust
property for itself or sell its own property to the trust, the trustee
must secure the court's permission to enter the transaction or else risk

liability.
The North Carolina Supreme Court validated the statutory ban
on trustee self-dealing in Wachovia Bank & Trust Company v.

Johnston.75 Here the corporate trustee petitioned the court for
permission to purchase the corpus of the trust. 76 The adult
beneficiaries had received full and complete information about the
proposed sale from the trustee and joined in the trustee's petition.77
The issue, as framed by the parties, was whether circumstances were

such that a sale of the trust property was justified.7

After deciding

that the facts of the case necessitated the sale of the trust property,

the court questioned the legality of the trustee purchasing the
property.7 9 The state's highest court considered both equitable' and
74. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-66 (1999). The prohibition is accomplished by the
combination of four separate statutes. Section 36A-66 of the North Carolina General
Statutes prohibits the trustee of an express trust, or most of its related entities, from
buying property from or selling property to the trust. Sections 36A-78 and 36A-79
disallow the settlor and the beneficiaries, respectively, from relieving the trustee from
liability for future self-dealing acts. Section 36A-80, "for cause shown and upon notice to
the beneficiaries," gives the court the power to permit the trustee to self-deal, if the
trustee "has acted honestly and reasonably." Id. § 36A-80.
The beneficiary may forgive past self-dealing, but may not consent to future selfdealing. See § 36A-79. This arrangement seems to allow even the fully-informed
beneficiary an opportunity to wait and see how the deal turns out before relieving the
trustee from liability. Indeed, the language of this statute suggests that the legislature
intended for the beneficiary to have every opportunity to hold the trustee liable, even if
the beneficiary gave his fully-informed consent to the transaction. The language of the
statute notwithstanding, it is unclear whether a court would actually assess liability under
those circumstances. See LEE, supra note 35, at 81, 155-56 (stating that a beneficiary who
consents after complete disclosure may not be heard to complain).
75. 269 N.C. 701,153 S.E.2d 449 (1967).
76. See id at 704, 153 S.E.2d at 453. The trust consisted of a parcel of downtown real
estate with an office building located on it. See idL at 702, 153 S.E.2d at 451. The local
planning commission designated the building as dilapidated, and net rental income from
the building was expected to decline to the point that the property would not generate
satisfactory income to the beneficiaries. See id. at 703-04, 153 S.E.2d at 452.
77. See id. at 705,153 S.E.2d at 453.
78. See iU2 at 706,153 S.E.2d at 454.
79. See id at 710, 153 S.E.2d at 457. The court put forth the same reasoning for the
propriety of the prohibition under the UTA as earlier courts gave prior to its passage, See
supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. The court explained that when presented with
the conflict inherent in self-dealing transactions, "there is always the danger that [the
trustee] will yield to the call of self-interest." Wachovia Bank & Trust, 269 N.C. at 715,
153 S.E.2d at 459-60.
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legal"' authorities in concluding that the lower court had the power to
permit the sale of trust property to the trustee in exceptional cases. s2
Nevertheless, the court held that it could not determine whether the
case constituted such an exception,'m because Wachovia had not
shown that it was the only buyer willing to purchase the property on
such favorable terms.84 Consequently, the court could not sanction
Wachovia's purchase of the trust property.8 Wachovia Bank & Trust
reinforced the statutory self-dealing prohibition by adhering to the
principle that, notwithstanding the beneficiaries' informed consent
and a good-faith belief that the transaction promotes the
beneficiaries' interests, the trustee must satisfy the
court that the
86
transaction is appropriate in order to escape liability.
As evidenced by the holding in Wachovia Bank & Trust, North
80. See Wachovia Bank & Trust, 269 N.C. at 710-15, 153 S.E.2d at 457-59. The court
relied on case law from both North Carolina and surrounding jurisdictions as well as trust
law treatises. See id.
81. See idU at 714, 153 S.E.2d at 459. In reaching its conclusion, the court quoted the
text of sections 36-28 and 36-42 of the North Carolina General Statutes (now codified as
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-66, 36A-80). See id
82. See Wachovia Bank & Trust, 269 N.C. at 715, 153 S.E.2d at 460. The court stated
that although it was "recognizing and reaffirming" the prohibition on trustee self-dealing,
there were "rare and justifiable exceptions" when the court might authorize self-dealing
upon proof that (1) the trustee has completely disclosed all the facts, (2) the transaction
would materially promote the trust's and the beneficiaries' best interests, and (3) there
were no other entities willing to enter into the same transaction on as favorable or more
favorable terms. Id.
83. The court remanded for further findings of fact as to whether Wachovia
advertised the sale and whether Wachovia received other equal or better offers to
purchase. See id. at 715,153 S.E.2d at 461.
84. See i&t at 716, 153 S.E.2d at 460.
85. The court stated that the showing of adequate advertisement and the
unavailability of comparable purchasers were necessary precautions so that the record
would reflect neither the "appearance of [n]or opportunity for fraud." Id.
86. A court will examine the transaction only upon petition by one of the
beneficiaries. See supra note 72 (explaining that a beneficiary must petition the court
before it will intervene). Such a petitioner may seek one or more of several available
remedies. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (listing the remedies available to
beneficiaries for a trustee's breach of trust). However, if each beneficiary gave his fully
informed consent, whether the courts will interpret the statutes as providing a remedy is
unclear. See LEE, supra note 35, at 81. The court might look to the common law rules of
equity to allow a good-faith trustee to escape liability for a transaction that appeared to
promote the beneficiaries' interests. See infra notes 152-83 and accompanying text
(describing a New Mexico case in which the court looked to the common law to find a
good faith exception to a statutory self-dealing ban). If the deal reached an unfavorable
result for the beneficiaries, especially if it involved a foreseeable risk to the interests of the
beneficiaries, the court might reaffirm its historical view and grant relief to the
complaining beneficiaries. In addition to the foregoing possibilities, section 36A-80 of the
North Carolina General Statutes grants courts the power to excuse self-dealing
transactions by an honest and reasonable trustee. See supra note 74.
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Carolina courts will not grant the trustee permission to self-deal
unless they find that the trustee is the only party willing to deal with

the trust on the stated terms.'

Thus, in 1967, the UTA had

accomplished the legislature's goal of clarifying and tightening the

prohibition against self-dealing.
Since then, the North Carolina legislature has added several
statutory exceptions to the self-dealing prohibition.
These
exceptions are obvious concessions to the pressures of modem trust
administration, and they allow the settlor to grant the power to the

trustee to enter into certain quasi-self-dealing transactions through
express language in the trust instrument. The statutes, however, still

impose restrictions on the trustee's exercise of the power and require
full disclosure and accounting to the beneficiaries. 89 Whether the self-

dealing prohibition retains the strength given to it by the Wachovia
Bank & Trust court more than thirty years ago or whether the
exceptions favoring the corporate trustee have weakened its force is

uncertain.
Historically, trust administration was undertaken largely by
individuals. 9° In that context, the "inexorable rule" 91 that a trust must
be managed for the exclusive benefit of the beneficiaries drew a clear

line and kept
transactionsf 2
became more
encouraged to

the courts free of litigation over the fairness of
As investment options open to modem trustees
varied and complex,93 trust settlors often were
seek professional trustees with the knowledge and

resources to use those options for the benefit of the trust.94 Corporate

trustees were the only entities capable of competently performing

87. See Wachovia Bank & Trust, 269 N.C. at 715,153 S.E.2d at 460.
88. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-66.1 (1999) (allowing the trustee to purchase
securities underwritten by the trusteee); § 36A-66.2 (permitting the trustee to invest trust
funds in the trustee's proprietary mutual funds). Section 36A-66.1 was passed in 1985. See
Act of July 1, 1985, ch. 549, sec. 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 617, 617 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 36A-66.1 (1999)). Section 36A-66.2 was adopted in 1993. See Act of June 7, 1993,
ch. 126, sec. 1, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 200, 200-01 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-66.1
(1999)).
89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-66.1, 36A-66.2.

90. See PeeringInto Trust Industry Archives, 115 TR.& EST.452,453 (1976).
91. See McEachem v. Stewart, 114 N.C. 370,371,19 S.E. 702,703 (1894).
92. The clarity of the "no further inquiry" rule, which applied when the trustee had
not obtained the beneficiaries' fully informed consent, was largely responsible for this lack
of litigation. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
93. See MARTIN M. SHENKMAN, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF TRUSTS 7 (2d ed. 1998)

(cautioning settlors that modem trust management may be beyond the capabilities of most
non-professionals).

94. See id.
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increasingly complex trustee functions.95
Until recently, corporate trustees were either the trust
departments of banks or independent trust companies. 96 In the last
twenty years, most national and regional broker-dealers have
acquired national trustee powers. 97
For these firms, trust
management has become a way of increasing the asset pool for
investments and of retaining commissions by offering trust services
for existing clients. 98 The passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act99
clears the way for even more complex, and potentially abusive,
combinations of financial institutions."°
As financial service
95. A trustee with no knowledge of investment matters can hire professional
investment advisors or money managers, so long as the trust does not expressly bar this
action. See SHENKMAN, supra note 93 at 78. Engaging such a professional, however,
means additional costs to the trust. Thus, appointing a skilled investor as trustee preserves
more income for the beneficiaries.
96. See William F. Ottinger, Selling Against Non-Bank Competitors,TR. & EST., Oct.
1993, at 10, 12.
97. See Henry A. Feldman, Jr., Where the Trust Industry May Be Heading, TR. &
EsT., Sept. 1992, at 42,42; Ottinger, infra note 96, at 10,12.
98. For example, financial services giant Merrill Lynch has stressed the importance of
its asset management services (including trust administration) as a vehicle to increase
revenues and profits. See MERRILL LYNCH, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 4-5 (1999) ("Our
clients have long turned to Merrill Lynch for a total financial relationship-integrated
services that are personally tailored and delivered through a central point of contact."); cf.
Jeffrey Keegan, The Europeans Are Coming, INVEsTmENT DEALER'S DIG., Sept. 27,
1999, at 14, 16 ("In the future, there will be a certain number of companies with wide
distribution and multiple product lines that will compete to get our money into their
system and keep it by providing us with financial products that we'll need throughout our
entire lifetime." (quoting Jim MacNaughton, head of global FIG M&A at Salomon Smith
Barney)).
99. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.)
1338. The Act allows banks, including trust companies, insurance companies, and brokerdealers to own each other. See id. § 103. The Act has been both praised and criticized; it
grants more opportunity for lucrative combinations, but it also subjects the entities to a
myriad of complex regulations and regulators. See Lisa I. Fried, Corporate Update,
Gramm-Leach-Bliley: Financial-IndustryLawyers See Mixed Blessing, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 6,
2000, at 5.
100. See Fried, supra note 99, at 5. The combination of trust companies, brokerdealers, and insurance companies presents other issues which should be considered. For
example, the personal information of a client of one of the companies under the corporate
umbrella, gained in the course of a transaction, will be accessible by the others. See
Gramm-Leach-Biley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.) 1338, §§502,
503 (putting no restrictions on sharing nonpublic customer information among affiliates so
long as the sharing policy is disclosed). Thus, a broker-dealer's affiliated trust institution
could not only provide assets to be managed for fees and commissions, but it also may
provide the names and financial data of beneficiaries who may be solicited as customers in
their own right. While this sort of information swapping is common, and perhaps even
expected, from mail-order companies and credit card issuers, the idea that a trustee-a
fiduciary--couldmake the beneficiaries' personal information available to its affiliates or
others for its own profit is shocking. This issue and others like it are beyond the scope of
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providers merge and consolidate in an effort to provide complete
offerings of financial products and services to retail clients, '1 1 assets
by the broker-dealer affiliated trustees ,will continue to
managed
02
grow.
Many of the corporate trustees chartered and operating in North
Carolina are affiliated with broker-dealers. 10 3 Prohibited self-dealing
transactions, in the context of the trustee's relationship with its
affiliated broker-dealer, involve situations when the trustee purchases
from or sells to its affiliate stocks, bonds, or other investment
property on behalf of the trust. North Carolina's self-dealing
prohibition does not bar a trustee from using an affiliated company as
a broker.' 4 Likewise, North Carolina General Statute section 36A-66
allows a third party to purchase shares underwritten by the trustee or
its affiliate' 0 5 and to invest in the trustee's proprietary mutual funds. 0 6
In the context of a broker-dealer affiliate, the statute appears to
prohibit only the affiliate's role as a dealer for the trustee.' °
this Comment, but they should be part of any debate surrounding the standard of behavior
for North Carolina trustees.
101. See Ottinger, supra note 96, at 10.
102. See Merrill Lynch Press Release (visited May 18, 2000) <http://www.ml.com/
woml/pressjrelease/19980805-1.htm)> ("Since 1987, the Merrill Lynch trust companies
have grown to $65 billion in client assets held in personal trusts, employee benefit trusts,
and custody accounts.").
103. The North Carolina Commissioner of Banks lists sixty-eight commercial banks
and five trust companies (limited purpose banks) operating in North Carolina. See NC
State-Charted Banks (visited Sept. 1, 2000) <http://www.banking.state.nc.us/bklist.htm>.
Of those, at least twenty-two have an affiliation with a broker-dealer. See id. North
Carolina recently adopted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, an act that eases the
restrictions historically placed on trust investments under the "prudent person rule." See
1999 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 215, § 1 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-161 to -173 (1999));
see also TRAIN & MELFE, supra note 14, at 21-25 (tracing the development of the prudent
person rule's investment restrictions); Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule for
Trustee Investment and Modern Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REv. 87, 88-92 (discussing
how the "prudent person" rule and the limitations that it has placed on trust investments
have evolved over time).
104. This exclusion is somewhat intuitive because a broker does not buy or sell on its
own account. Nonetheless, the potential still exists for the trustee to serve its own
interests by activities such as increasing the number of trades to generate more
commissions for the affiliated broker, a practice commonly known as "churning." See
infra note 115. Churning, however, is prohibited by federal laws governing broker-dealers.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1999).
105. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-66.1 (1999) (addressing investments in securities by
banks or trust companies). Although the statute permits the purchase of the trusteeunderwritten shares, it does so only on the condition that the trustee does not purchase
them from itself or from a co-underwriter with whom the trustee has a reciprocal purchase
agreement. See id.
106. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-66.2 (1999) (addressing investments in mutual funds).
107. Many large financial services corporations also have affiliated insurance,
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While North Carolina's statutory self-dealing prohibition clearly
seems to apply to trustees buying and selling securities from the
inventory of its affiliated broker-dealer,"'8 some corporate trustees
doing business in North Carolina are seemingly unaware of the ban's
existence. For example, at least one corporate trustee openly
requires the trust instrument to include a provision granting it the
power to self-deal with its affiliated broker-dealers.0 9 Whether this
requirement is evidence of a blatant disregard for the ban or merely
ignorance of its scope is unclear. Regardless, a trustee's inclusion of
such language should be sufficient to raise the suspicions of the
beneficiaries.
The suspicion of trustee self-dealing with regard to securities has
a long history. In 1936, Professor Austin W. Scott'10 examined the
idea of allowing corporate trustees to sell securities owned by the
trustees or their affiliates to the trust."' He concluded that because
the corporate trustee had a duty of loyalty to its shareholders, selfdealing by a corporate trustee may well be more dangerous to the
beneficiaries than the self-dealing of an individual trustee." 2 An
additional consideration, according to Professor Scott, was the danger
that the trust company would make the trust estates a "dumping
ground for securities left on its shelves."" 3
mortgage, and real estate companies. The purchase of insurance, mortgage interests, or
other property from any of these affiliates on behalf of the trust would also constitute a
prohibited act of self-dealing. This Comment, however, concentrates on the self-dealing
that occurs when the trust company's affiliate purchases and sells securities as a dealer.
108. The clear and unambiguous language of section 36A-66 of the North Carolina
General Statutes makes no exceptions to the "property" included in its self-dealing ban.
Consequently, it is appropriate to presume that none were intended. See Sara Lee Corp.
v. Carter, 351 N.C. 27, 36, 519 S.E.2d 308, 313 (1999) (quoting Upchurch v. Hudson
Funeral Home, Inc., 263 N.C. 560, 565, 140 S.E.2d 17, 21 (1965) (quoting 50 AM. JUR.
Statutes § 432, at 453 (1944) (stating that the absence of an exception creates a
presumption that none exists))).
109. MERRILL LYNCH TRUST, TRUST AGREEMENT PROVISIONS 2 (1996) (requiring
that all trust agreements include a provision granting Merrill Lynch Trust the power "[t]o
engage any corporation, partnership or other entity affiliated with Merrill Lynch Trust (an
"Affiliated Entity") to render services to any trust" including the authority "[t]o act as a
broker or dealer to execute transactions.") (on file with North CarolinaLaw Review).
110. Professor Scott (1884-1981) was one of the foremost authorities on the law of
trusts. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 558 (6th ed. 2000).
111. See Austin Wakeman Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARv. L. REv. 521,
543-45 (1936).
112. See id. at 544 ("[IThe temptation to favor the shareholders may well be more
insidious than the temptation of an individual trustee to favor himself.").
113. I& Professor Scott's reasoning suggests that once a trustee is permitted to deal
with its affiliates, the beneficiaries must be prepared to scrutinize every self-dealing
transaction and the available alternatives to determine whether their interests were served
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One must consider, however, that in the modern investing
environment, trustee self-dealing in securities with broker-dealer

affiliates differs significantly from self-dealing in other types of
property. First, there is substantial government regulation of
securities trading. The conduct of broker-dealers is governed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 14 For example, if a

broker-dealer controls the trading account, it is prohibited from
making excessive trades solely for the purpose of generating fees, 115
Thus,
and it is subject to strict disclosure requirements." 6
transactions on behalf of the trust between a trustee and its affiliated
broker-dealer have safeguards beyond those found in trust law.
Second, in addition to government regulation, the investing
public has access to vast amounts of information.

Investors can

obtain online the most recent stock prices, the range of selling prices
throughout the day, and charts tracking the performance of stocks, a
certain index, or even an entire exchange." 7 SEC filings, reports, and

corporate prospectuses can be searched, read, and downloaded." '
Nearly instantaneous access to such information has changed the

dynamics of investing, seemingly making it more difficult for selfalong with those of the trustee. But if the trustee is prohibited from self-dealing, the
beneficiary may presume that any particular investment decision is made with only the
best interests of the trust in mind.
114. The SEC has both direct and indirect jurisdiction over broker-dealers. The direct
jurisdiction is primarily set forth in the statutes included in the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, ch. 404, 49, Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a to
78mm (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)), and the rules promulgated thereunder. See THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 458 (3d ed. 1996); infranotes 115-16; see
also, 15 U.S.C.A. §78(o)(b)(4) (giving the SEC authority to discipline broker-dealers for
conduct that violates the 1934 Act, if such discipline is in the public interest).
Additionally, the SEC regulates broker-dealers indirectly through its oversight of the
securities industry's self-regulatory organizations and national exchanges. See HAZEN,
supra, at 458,468-70.
115. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1999). This practice, known as "churning," is
prohibited when the broker-dealer has control over the trading of the account. See
HAZEN, supra note 114, at 515-16.
116. For example, the broker-dealer must disclose whether it acts as a principal or as
an agent in the transaction. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)(2) (1999). Thus, a brokerdealer affiliate is legally bound to disclose whether the transaction involves self-dealing.
Where the broker-dealer's client is its affiliated trust company, the value of that disclosure
is questionable.
117. For examples of the resources available online, see PersonalFinance Web Center
(visited Sept. 1, 2000) <http:llwww.compuserve.comlgateway/personalfinancel>;
E*TRADE (visited Sept. 1, 2000) <http://www.etrade.com>; and Ameritrade (visited Sept.
1, 2000) <http://www.ameritrade.com>.
118. See Securities

Exchange

Commission, EDGAR Database of Corporate

Information (visited Sept. 1, 2000) <http:llwww.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm> (a database of
company SEC filings).
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dealing trustees to take advantage of an unsuspecting beneficiary,
because the price at which the trustee bought or sold a security can
easily be compared with the market price." 9 As a consequence, one
of the primary dangers of self-dealing-the trustee taking advantage
of its position of confidence and control to get a better price for
itself2---is apparently absent from securities transactions between
the trustee and its affiliate.'
Even though purchasing securities from the inventory of the
trustee's affiliate does not pose an obvious threat to the interests of
beneficiaries when the exchange is at market price, the interests of
the beneficiaries are still subject to harm through the trustee's selfdealing. There are numerous opportunities for temptation when the
trustee has the power to deal freely with its affiliate.'2 For example,
the trustee may be tempted to serve its own interests by choosing to
deal in a certain security so that its affiliate may increase or decrease
its position in a certain stock. If the trust's sale or purchase of the
stock does not violate the "prudent investor rule," 1 3 the trustee and
its affiliate may use the trust as a vehicle to achieve that goal. In that
case, while the trust would not pay any more to use an affiliated
dealer to complete the transaction, the transaction itself is made to
further the trustee's interests, not the beneficiaries' interests. A selfdealing prohibition is one way of removing the temptation to engage
in this type of behavior.
Another situation that could prove detrimental to the interests of
the trust's beneficiaries involves negotiating the purchase of large
119. See supra note 117.
120. See supra note 39 (discussing the dangers of self-dealing).
121. See EDWARD S. HERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:

COMMERCIAL BANK

TRUST DEPARTMENTS xv (1975) ("[I]t is imperative to recognize that the self-serving
opportunities present in conflict-of-interest situations are usually not exploited.").
122. This Comment addresses the most basic ways a trustee may serve its own interests
by using its affiliated dealer. There are many, much more complex, forms of investments
and transactions through which the trustee and its affiliate may obtain similar or even
greater benefits. See generally HERMAN, supra note 121 (discussing the various conflicts
of interest faced by the trust departments of commercial banks).
123. The "prudent investor rule" has been codified in the Uniform Prudent Investor
Act and adopted in 45 states, including North Carolina. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR
ACT § 1, 7B U.L.A. 61 (Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-161 to 36A-173 (1999).
This rule mandates that a trustee's performance should be evaluated "not in isolation but
in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-162(b) (1999).
See also TRAIN & MELFE, supra note 14, at 25-34 (explaining that "the essence of the
New Rule is that no investments or techniques are imprudent per se"). Thus, an individual
investment decision will not be scrutinized closely so long as the trustee demonstrates
prudence in its overall investment strategy. See iL at 39. The UTC incorporates the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act. See UNIF. TRUST CODE art. 9 (2000).
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quantities of stock. In an arm's-length transaction,124 the buyer can
sometimes use the volume he brings to the dealer to negotiate a price
lower than the published market price.1'5 When a trustee purchases
securities from its affiliate, the trustee negotiates with itself. With the
usual safeguard of a published market price no longer present, 126 the
beneficiary is particularly vulnerable to the trustee's self-interest. 27
Trustee self-dealing may also provide a disincentive for
corporate trustees to search for the best investment opportunities for
the trust. Permitting a trustee to self-deal by purchasing its affiliate's
products, even though other products or prices' 28 may better serve the
interests of the beneficiaries, will inhibit outside competition for the
trust's investment dollars. 129
As the foregoing discussion indicates, unsupervised self-dealing
between corporate trustees and their broker-dealer affiliates would
124. When an employee of the firm, whom the client considers to be "his" broker,
makes these negotiations, whether the transaction is really at arm's length is uncertain. In
that situation, however, the person having final approval of the price (the client) is at
arm's length from the dealer. In the trust context, final approval is vested in the trustee,
who is not at arm's length from the dealer.
125. See Telephone Interview with Jerry W. Markham, Professor of Law, University of
North Carolina School of Law (July 27,2000).
126. Usually the published market price is the barometer for measuring the deal's
fairness. But when the norm under the circumstances is for the price to be less than the
published market price, the beneficiary loses that protection. Even if the price is lower
than market price, knowing whether the price is as low as one dealing at arm's length
would get is difficult to determine with certainty. See Telephone Interview with Jerry W.
Markham, supra note 125.
127. The abundance of timely financial information should prevent dealers from taking
advantage of the trust on price issues for most publicly-traded stocks. See supra notes
117-118. In the case of private placements or the bulk sale, however, no "market price"
exists beyond that negotiated between the dealer and the trustee. See Telephone
Interview with Jerry W. Markham, supra note 125. When the price may vary, as is often
the case, the safety net of a published price by which to judge the fairness of securities
transactions between the trustee and the affiliate is lost. See supra notes 114-16 and
accompanying text.
128. Because the emphasis under the Prudent Investor Act is the trustee's overall
investment strategy, the availability of a better performing investment, standing alone, will
probably not support a finding that the trustee violated the Prudent Investor Act. See
supra note 123 and accompanying text.
129. When the affiliated dealer's products are clearly inferior to competition or cost
significantly more, the trustee will likely be prodded by fear of liability to venture outside
its corporate boundaries and purchase from a third-party. But when the affiliate's product
is not performing quite as well as that offered by another or when the price of the
affiliate's product is just slightly higher than that of its competitor's, the trustee's choice to
invest with its affiliate will likely not violate the prudent investor rule. See supra note 123
and accompanying text. In that instance, even though the trustee's interest in keeping the
profits in-house may directly conflict with the beneficiaries interest in getting the best
product at the best price, the trustee will be able to subordinate the beneficiaries' interests
to its own without incurring liability for a breach of duty.
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pose a risk of harm to the beneficiaries of North Carolina trusts.
Many of the concerns voiced by North Carolina courts over 100 years
ago are still relevant to trustees engaging in modern-day securities
transactions. Therefore, any easing of the self-dealing ban should be
carefully considered.
III. A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE UNIFORM TRUST AcT's AND
UNIFORM TRUST CODE'S SELF-DEALING PROVISIONS

A recent upswing in trust activity130 and the entry of new
participants' into the trust administration arena has driven the
NCCUSL to attempt to unify current trust law on a national level.3 2
To this end, the NCCUSL has drafted and approved the Uniform
Trust Code. The UTC is a comprehensive code designed to provide
precise guidance on trust law 33 and to either replace or incorporate
134
four existing uniform acts, including the UTA.

The UTC superimposes a duty to administer the trust in good
faith 35 and "solely in the interest of the beneficiaries" on the trustee's
exercise of any of its powers. 6 In keeping with this duty, the general
rule under the UTC is that transactions affected by a conflict between
the trustee's personal interests and fiduciary duty, such as self-dealing

130. The NCCUSL stated that the use of trusts for both commercial and estateplanning purposes has increased in recent years. See UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note
(Draft for Approval 2000). Since World War II, the increased use is largely attributable to
three factors: (1) the grantor's ability to avoid probate through the use of inter vivos
trusts, (2) the effectiveness of trusts as a vehicle for minimizing taxes, and (3) the
usefulness of trusts in managing private wealth. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M.
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUST, AND ESTATES 443-44 (4th ed. 1990).
131. The new participants consist largely of the trust arms of large brokerage firms.
See Ottinger, supra note 96, at 10.
132. See UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (2000 Annual Meeting Draft) (describing
the current state of trust law in most jurisdictions as "thin").
133. The NCCUSL hoped the UTC would "provide States with precise guidance on
trust law questions ... in an easily findable place." UNiF. TRUST CODE prefatory note
(Draft for Approval 2000).
134. The uniform acts that will be replaced or incorporated are the Uniform Trustee
Powers Act, the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, the Uniform Probate Code Article VII,
and the UTA. See UNio. TRUST CODE prefatory note, § 1204 cmt (Draft for Approval
2000). The NCCUSL recommends that states enacting the UTC repeal these acts. See
UNF. TRUST CODE §1204 (2000). Article IX of the UTC is reserved for the incorporation
of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §1204 cmt. (Draft for
Approval 2000).
135. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 801 (2000) ("Upon acceptance of a trusteeship, the
trustee shall administer the trust in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes
and the interests of the beneficiaries, and in accordance with this [Code].").
136. IL at § 802(a) (2000).
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rule.138
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and are subject to the

"no further inquiry
Even in the absence of self-dealing, the
for any profits it makes as a
trustee is accountable to the beneficiaries
139
result of its position with the trust.
However, unlike the UTA, the UTC does not impose an absolute
prohibition on trustee self-dealing. On the contrary, if "expressly
authorized by the terms of the trust," self-dealing is not a breach of
the trustee's duty of loyalty at all;' the settlor's authorization alone
snatches the self-dealing transaction from the jaws of strict liability
and places it gently on the same footing as transactions unaffected by
a conflict of interest. 141 Thus, even though from the beneficiaries'

perspective the economic outcome of the self-dealing transaction may
be the same with or without a permissive provision in the trust
instrument, the consequences to the trustee are vastly different.
Viewing the power of the settlor to permit trustee self-dealing

from the beneficiaries' perspective reveals a major difference
142 Under the UTA, a trustee who
between the UTA and the UTC.

wishes to deal with the trust with the settlor's permission must still
obtain court approval.' 43 The beneficiaries are notified and have an
opportunity to be heard.144 No such notice is required under the
UTC,145 so the beneficiaries may not even be aware that the selfdealing transaction has occurred. Additionally, the power to enter
137. See id.at § 802(b) (2000).
138. Id. at § 802(b) cmt. (Draft for Approval 2000); see also supra note 44 and
accompanying text (explaining the rule).
139. See id. at §1003(a) (2000). The trustee is allowed to retain compensation earned.
See §1003(a) cmt. (Draft for Approval 2000).
140. UNiI. TRUST CODE §802 cmt. (Draft for Approval 2000). The Comment to
section 802 does not indicate whether the express language must refer to a specific selfdealing transaction or whether a broad grant of the power to self-deal will be sufficient to
protect the trustee from liability for breach of trust.
141. See id.(stating that "no breach of the duty of loyalty occurs if the transaction was
expressly authorized by the terms of the trust").
142. Another difference is the beneficiaries' ability to relieve the trustee from liability.
Recall that under the UTA, the beneficiaries cannot give forward permission; they can
only absolve the trustee after the fact. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-79 (1999); supra note
74. Under the UTC, the beneficiaries can do both. See UNiF. TRUST CODE § 802(b)(4)
(2000). This difference benefits the trustee by removing the uncertainty surrounding the
view a court would take of the equitable defense of consent if it were used by a trustee
against a charge of self-dealing. See supranote 86.
143. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §36A-80 (1999).
144. See id.
145. The UTC does require the trustee to keep the beneficiaries reasonably informed
and to report to them at least annually. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 (2000). It is unclear
whether the UTC requires such detail that would reveal self-dealing securities transactions
if the transactions were approved in the trust instrument.
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into these transactions without judicial oversight, long viewed as
perilous for the beneficiaries, may not have been granted to the
trustee voluntarily. 146 Thus, the UTC could have the ultimate effect

of inhibiting the beneficiaries' ability to protect themselves from a
transaction that the settlor felt compelled to authorize only because
of a desire for competent trust management. 147
IV. AN EXAMINATON OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO SELF-DEALING
CORPORATE TRUSTEES
At present, at least some corporate trustees do not acknowledge
the state's self-dealing ban.'
If those trustees are engaging in
prohibited self-dealing, under the auspices of the settlor's grant of
permission, the time may come when a disgruntled beneficiary sues,
not on the basis of unfairness or imprudence, but simply because the
trustee breached its duty of loyalty by purchasing stocks from the
inventory of its affiliate in violation of section 36A-66 of the North
Carolina General Statutes. 149 The outcome of such a case in North
Carolina is uncertain' due to the lack of case law decided under the
UTA and the competing equitable factors likely to be considered by a
court deciding such a case. Consequently, case law from other states
that have adopted the UTA will be instructive.
New Mexico adopted the UTA, including its self-dealing ban, in
5
1951.151 In Tays v. Metler,1
2 a recent unpublished decision, the Tenth
Circuit addressed New Mexico's statutory ban on trustee self-dealing
and may have given North Carolina trustees a preview of the likely
judicial treatment of claims brought under legislation modeled on the
146. See text accompanying supra notes 93-96.
147. See supranote 93-95 and accompanying text.

148. See supranote 109 and accompanying text.
149. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-66 (1999).
150. In terms of equity considerations, if the transactions at issue were made "honestly
and reasonably," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-80 (1999), the court may relieve the trustee from
liability. If, however, the trustee had knowledge of the ban, either actual or imputed, then

the court may find the honesty element missing. The settlor's explicit authorization of the
transaction(s) in the trust instrument favors relief. Nevertheless, the settlor's probable
ignorance of the self-dealing prohibition and the trustee's likely insistence on the inclusion
of the permissive provision may create an illusive authorization. Even the behavior of the
petitioning beneficiary could be a factor; authorities suggest that a beneficiary who ratifies
the trustee's action by accepting the profits from some of the transactions with knowledge
of their self-dealing origins may be estopped from complaining later. See LEE, supra note
35, at 156.
151. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-2-5, 46-2-14, 46-2-15, 46-2-16 (Michie 1997) (codifying
Uniform Trust Act sections 5, 17, 18, and 19). These statutes were approved by the New
Mexico legislature in 1951. See 1951 N.M. Laws ch. 193, §5.
152. See No. 97-2317, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4769 (10th Cir. Mar. 19, 1999).
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UTA. The settlor in Tays named her husband as trustee of a trust
whose income would be divided between him and her sons. 3 The
trust instrument gave the trustee broad powers to manage the trust 54
and stated the settlor's "intention to give my ...Trustee the same
power of investment and reinvestment which I might myself possess

in the management of my property."' 55 Four years after the settlor's
death, the trustee transferred real property that he owned to the trust,
removed almost all of the liquid assets from the trust, and deposited

them in his own account. 55 The evidence indicated that the value of
the property exceeded the value of the trust assets taken in

exchange. 7 Nevertheless, one of the settlor's sons sued in federal
district court,5 claiming that his father, the trustee, had violated New

Mexico's statutory ban on trustee self-dealing.

59

The district court,

finding a good faith exception to the rule against self-dealing,'

held

6
that the trustee's act did not violate the law.' '
In considering the son's appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted the
absence of case law on point in both New Mexico and other
jurisdictions in the Tenth Circuit' 6 and thus looked to courts outside

the Tenth Circuit for guidance. 63 In doing so, the court recognized

the existence of a common law good faith exception to the statutory
rule against self-dealing and affirmed the district court's decision."6
153. See id. at *3.
154. See id. at *4.
155. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellant at 190, Tays (No. 97-2317)).
156. See id. at *5.
157. See id.
158. The opinion is unclear as to the basis for the federal district court's jurisdiction;
because the plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims were based on New Mexico state
law, the jurisdiction was probably based on the parties' diversity of citizenship.
159. See id. at *7. The son's complaint was not founded on a claim of bad faith or
unfairness on the part of the trustee; the sole basis of the cause of action was New
Mexico's statutory ban on trustee self-dealing. See id. For New Mexico's statutory ban,
see sections 46-2-5 and 46-2-14 of New Mexico Statutes Annotated. See N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46-2-5, 46-2-14 (Michie 1997).
160. See Tays, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4769, at *7.
161. See id. at *2.
162. See id.at *8.
163. See icL
164. See id. at *12. The court also held that even if the transaction had been a violation
of the self-dealing prohibition, the trial court had the discretion to excuse the violation
under section 42-2-16 of the New Mexico Statutes Annotated. Id. at *13 ("A court of
competent jurisdiction may ...excuse a trustee who has acted honestly and reasonably
from liability for violations of the provisions of this act."). Thus, the court acknowledged
that it had the unilateral power, by statute, to relieve the trustee from liability for selfdealing if the trustee could show that it had acted "honestly and reasonably." The court's
decision to inject a common law exception into the statutory ban, rather than relying on its
statutory ability to relieve the trustee from liability, is instructive.
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An examination of the cases relied on by the court reveals that the
court's decision rests on what is at best a strained interpretation of the
extra-jurisdictional opinions.
The Tays court depended heavily on Bank of Nevada v. Speirs6
to support its determination that a common law good faith exception
to New Mexico's statutory ban on trustee self-dealing exists.'6 The
court stated that Speirs was instructive for the following two reasons:
(1) Nevada had also adopted the 1937 UTA and thus pertinent case
law from Nevada could help the court interpret the statutes
uniformly 67 and (2) the trust arrangement in Speirs-a trusteehusband with broad discretionary power-was similar to the
arrangement in Tays. 1' While the Tays court correctly identified
these attributes of Speirs, the court neglected to address a fact that
irrefutably distinguishes the two cases. Because the trustee in Speirs
did not buy or sell property from or to the trust,'69 Nevada's statutory
self-dealing ban was not at issue in the case. Thus, the good faith
exception' that the Tays court purported to derive from Speirs7 1 and
then applied to the self-dealing transaction in Tays was not an
exception to statutory self-dealing at all. It was a common law
exception applied to a claim of breach of a common law duty, a claim
in which the defining element of Tays' claim, the statutory selfdealing, was strikingly absent.
The Tays court also cited three other extra-jurisdictional cases to
support a good faith exception to statutory self-dealing when the
165. 603 P.2d 1074 (Nev. 1979). The court found Speirs especially persuasive because
Nevada also had a statutory self-dealing prohibition.
166. See Tays, 1999 LEXIS 4769, at *9.
167. See id The court cited section 46-2-18 of the New Mexico Annotated Statutes as
authority for the proposition that the 1937 UTA "must be interpreted consistently with its
purpose to make the law uniform." Id.
168. See id
169. See Speirs, 603 P.2d at 1076. In Speirs, the trustee, who was the father of the
beneficiary, and the trust inherited from the settlor equal interests in the same property.
See id at 1075. Subsequently, the trustee purchased additional interests in the property.
See id. at 1076. After consulting an expert who opined that increasing the trust's

ownership interest in the property would be too risky for the trust, the trustee invested the
trust funds in other property. See id The beneficiary-daughter sued, claiming that the
trustee breached his fiduciary duty to her by not increasing the trust's position in the
investment by the same amount that he had increased his own. See id. The Nevada
Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and declared that the trustee had
not acted improperly. See id at 1077.
170. "[T]he trustee will not be penalized when he has acted in good faith and in a
manner he believes was for the best interest of the trust." Tays, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
4769, at *10 (quoting Speirs,603 P.2d at 1077).
171. See id.
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settlor intends a conflict of interest and gives the trustee broad
discretion to invest the trust funds.172 Like the Speirs holding,
however, the three cited cases do not support a good faith exception
to the statutory self-dealing ban under the Tays facts. For example, in
Gregory v. Moose,'73 the transaction at issue was not one of statutory
self-dealing. 74 Thus, the Tays court's extrapolation that the trustee
purchased property from the trust by characterizing Gregory's
holding as "no breach of trust... even though trustee benefited from
misrepresented the nature of the transaction.' 6
sale,"'175
Consequently, Gregory did not support the Tays holding.
The other two cases,' both decided under Illinois law, were also
inapplicable to Tays because Illinois has no statutory prohibition on
self-dealing. 78 Thus, any good faith exception to a rule against selfdealing expressed in those cases would be an exception to a common
law rule, rather than an exception to the UTA prohibition on selfdealing. Before extending this common law, good faith exception to
New Mexico's statutory ban, the appropriate inquiry to make is
whether the state's legislature intended such an exception.
In the Prefatory Note to the UTA, the NCCUSL made clear that
a primary objective of the model legislation was to make the rules
governing trustee loyalty more explicit and restrictive. 7 9 Indeed, the
Prefatory Comment indicates that the Act itself was born of a desire
to preempt the common law on the issues it addressed. 8 The
provisions expressly precluding the settlor and the beneficiary from
giving the trustee permission to self-deal,' 8 ' as well as the expression
172. The Tays court claimed that the good faith exception was supported by Gregory v.
Moose, 590 S.W.2d 665 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979), In re Estate of Halas, 568 N.E.2d 170 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991), and Bracken v. Block, 561 N.E.2d 1273 (il. App. Ct. 1990). See Tays, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 4769, at *8-9.
173. 590 S.W.2d 665 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979).
174. See iL at 670 ("There is no question but that self-dealing is a breach of trust ....
But that is not the case in the matter before us.").
175. Tays, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4769, at *8.
176. In Gregory, the trustee was also a beneficiary. See Gregory, 590 S.W.2d at 670.
Based upon the incomplete facts presented in the opinion, the trustee appeared to benefit
from the profit on the sale in his dual-capacity as beneficiary. See id.
App. Ct. 1991); Bracken v. Block,
177. See In re Estate of Halas, 568 N.E.2d 170 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990).
561 N.E.2d 1273 (Ill.
178. See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-1 (West 1992).
179. See UNw. TRUSTS Acr prefatory note, 7B U.L.A. 765 (1985); supra note 70 and
accompanying text (explaining that the purpose of the UTA was to clarify and tighten the
loyalty rules).
180. See UNIW. TRUSTS AC prefatory note, 7B U.L.A. 764-65 (1985) (explaining how
the UTA modifies or abolishes various common law rules).
181. See UNIF. TRUSTS ACT §§ 4, 17,18, 7B U.L.A. 773,787,790 (1985).
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of several specific exceptions, 2 are persuasive evidence that no
common law good faith exception was intended.183
When construing statutes, New Mexico state courts typically seek
to give effect to the legislature's intent by looking for the goal the
statute sought to achieve.' 4 Had the Tays court attempted to
determine the intent of the New Mexico legislature in passing the
UTA,8 5 it would have been guided by ample case law establishing the
state courts' practice of considering the plain language of the statute
in relation to the legislative act as a whole.186 Such an approach to
interpreting the UTA most likely would have led the Tenth Circuit to
a different conclusion.
Additionally, the Tays court could have gained useful insight into
the proper interpretation of the statutes by considering the New
Mexico Attorney General's understanding of the prohibition and the
existence of any exceptions. In a 1984 opinion issued on the matter,
the Attorney General's Office appears to have accepted the ordinary
meaning of the UTA's language and to have been unaware of any
exceptions, save those specifically expressed in the Act.ltm
The foregoing discussion indicates that the legislative intent
behind the passage of New Mexico's statutory prohibition was to
preclude trustees from self-dealing with the trust without court
approval outside the enumerated statutory exceptions."'8
182. See, e.g., id. at § 4, 7B U.L.A 773 (exempting a trustee's deposit of trust funds with
itself from the self-dealing ban); § 8, 7B U.L.A 778 (exempting the voting of corporate

stock by proxy from the common law rule against the delegation of trust powers).
183. A common law good faith exception, if adopted by North Carolina courts, would
shield a trustee from liability if the trustee reasonably believed that the transaction was in
the best interests of the beneficiary. Under the UTA, however, the trustee's good faith is
only one factor for the court to consider. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-80 (1999) (requiring
the trustee to have acted honestly and reasonably in order for the court to relieve it from
liability). Thus, good faith alone should not protect the trustee under UTA.
184. See, e.g., State ex rel Children, 995 P.2d 1060,1069 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).
185. See Tays v. Metier, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4769, at *1, *12-14 (10th Cir. Mar. 19,
1999).
186. See Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc. v. New Mexico Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 967 P.2d 827, 830-31 (N.M. 1997) (stating that the court's interpretation of
legislative intent is based on the ordinary meaning of the statute's language unless a
different intent is expressed clearly); In re Conservatorship of Chisolm, 973 P.2d 261, 263
(N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the process of judicial statutory interpretation should
include a reading of the entire legislative act and a consideration of each provision relative
to the others).
187. See 1983-1986 Op. Att'y Gen. N.M. 155 (1984) (concluding that under the UTA,

only a court, on a case-by-case basis, could relieve a trustee from liability for illegal selfdealing).
188. This assertion assumes the logical proposition that the New Mexico legislature was

aware of the state court's rules of statutory interpretation and desired the ordinary

2000]

TRUSTEE SELF-DEALING

1989

Accordingly, the Tays court's disregard of this intent and the plain

language of the statutes'89 in favor of a rule drawn from inapposite
case law' 90 is perplexing. Whether this action foreshadows the fate of

North Carolina's self-dealing ban should a beneficiary petition for its
application remains to be seen.' 9 '
Tays demonstrates how the courts can re-invent a statute that has
little active support,' 92 and it also provides further evidence of a

national trend toward the relaxation of many statutory safeguards
erected by fiduciary laws. 93 For North Carolina, determining the
origin of the movement toward easing those safeguards is the first
step in evaluating whether the state should relax its prohibition on
trustee self-dealing. Then the arguments both for and against giving

either the settlor or the beneficiary the power to permit trustee selfdealing should be considered in the context of that movement.

Several explanations account for the trend toward easing the
restrictions on the corporate trustee. 9 4 First, America has entered

the "Age of the Individual Investor,"'95 in which investors have
unprecedented access to financial information and markets. 96
Comprehensive financial information, once accessible by only
bankers and brokers, is available today from numerous media
outlets."9 The increased supply of financial information reflects an
language of the UTA to express its intent.
189. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-2-5, 46-2-14,46-2-15, and 46-2-16 (Michie 1997 Supp.).
These statutes codify the language of the UTA. See UNiF. TRUSTS ACT §§ 5, 17-19, 7B
U.L.A. 763 (1985).
190. See supranotes 172-78 and accompanying text.
191. The Tays decision demonstrates the possibility that if the North Carolina
legislature does not act to establish expressly that the self-dealing prohibition supplants
the common law exceptions, a beneficiary seeking the statute's protection may find
himself a victim of the self-dealer's good faith.
192. Because North Carolina does not appear to have empowered section 36A-66 of
the North Carolina General Statutes since Wachovia Bank & Tnst, 269 N.C. 701, 153
S.E.2d 449 (1967), a Tays4ike scenario could occur.
193. See Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New
Millenium, or, We Don't Have To Think of EnglandAnymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 548-

60 (explaining that "there seems to be an erosion in fiduciary responsibility in the trust
world"); supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing statutory exceptions to
North Carolina's self-dealing ban); supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing
the easing of Depression Era restrictions on corporate combinations of investment
companies, banks, and insurance companies).
194. This Comment has referred to the lifting of the prohibition as "allowing the
settlor" or "giving the settlor" the power to permit trustee self-dealing as if the settlor was
actually receiving something. In reality, the trustee gains something as well-relief from
liability for increasing its profits from a party who will not bear the burden in the future.
195. Joseph Nocera, Power to the People,FORTUNE, Oct. 11, 1999, at 124, 127.
196. See id.
197. Examples include newspapers (Wall Street Journal), magazines (Fortune, Money
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increased demand for such information. In 1999, forty-eight percent
of American households owned stock, up from only twenty-eight
percent in 1989.198 Additionally, more than twelve percent of
American investors are now buying and selling their stock online
without the aid of a stockbroker. 99 The world of stocks and bonds is
no longer the exclusive province of Wall Street.20 Investing has
'
"become an integral part of everyday life in middle-class America. 201
The second change is the recent trend toward ful-service
financial companies. In the not too distant past, insurance companies,
brokerage firms, and banks were all separate entities, referring clients
to one another as necessary. As brokerage and insurance firms
recognized the natural connection between investment and insurance
products, they began evolving into providers of "comprehensive
financial services."'' 2 Tightening competition for the investment
dollar caused these rapidly expanding financial service companies to
seek to offer their clients an increasing array of asset management
options. It soon became clear that the ability to provide banking
services, in addition to investments and insurance, would complete
their financial services offering and enable the companies to retain all
fees and commissions generated by their clients. 2°3 Until recently,
however, Depression Era legislation prohibited the affiliation of
banks with these comprehensive financial service providers. 2 4 The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 2°5 repealed the bulk of that legislation and
opened the door for competition between corporations providing a
complete package of financial services
The third major difference which might explain the current
movement to relax the self-dealing ban is that the stock market crash
Magazine, Kiplinger's), television (CNBC, CNN-fn), radio (Motley Fools, Investor's
Weekly), and internet (etrade, ameritrade).
198. See Andy Sewer, A Nation of Traders,FORTUNE, Oct. 11, 1999, at 116,118.
199. See id.
200. See id. ("For much of the nation's history ... Wall Street has had a monopoly on

all facets of the capital markets. It controlled not only the financing of America's
companies... but also the investments of individuals.").
201. Nocera, supra note 195, at 127 ("People talk about the market now in the same

way they talk about their health or their kids' schools or the weather. They tune in to
CNBC. They have their portfolios constantly updated on their office computers ....
[Investing] has become part of the popular culture.").
202. See Ottinger, supra note 96, at 10.

203. See Keegan, supranote 98, at 16-17.
204. See Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 20, 48 Stat. 88, repealed by the Gramm-LeachBliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.) 1341.
205. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
206. See Ottinger, supranote 96, at 12. See also supra notes 99-102 and accompanying
text (discussing the trend toward mega companies).
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of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed are no longer a part
of the collective memory of the nation. Because the crash occurred
over seventy years ago, the majority of Americans have no first-hand
knowledge of the financial environment that gave rise to the darkest
economic period in American history. The UTA was approved in the
aftermath of the Depression when many analysts pointed to the
overlap between commercial banks and securities firms as a primary

reason for the crash. 7 At that time, a law prohibiting trustees,
individual or corporate, from dealing with affiliated entities without
court supervision was thought not only wise, but necessary.? Since
then, economists have discounted the role that the connection
between banks and broker-dealers played in the crash.2 9 The late
1990s were a period of great public confidence in the stock market.210
Other financial institutions, most guaranteed by federal deposit
insurance, enjoyed similar levels of public confidence.2 ' The stock
market crash of 1929 and the economic instability which precipitated
it no longer seem relevant to financial activity today.
Modem investment opportunities and the resulting desire for
professional trust management are important considerations in the
formulation of a self-dealing rule. The UTC attempts to fulfill one of
the primary objectives of trust law-giving effect to the settlor's
intene---by allowing the express terms of the trust to control.V21 3 In
207. See Investment Co. Inst. ("ICI") v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971) ("Even before
the passage of the [Glass-Steagall] Act it was generally believed that it was improper for a
commercial bank to engage in investment banking directly."); see also Hazen, supra note
114, at 6-7; JONATHAN HUGHES & LouIs P. CAIN, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 499
n.22 (5th ed. 1998) (noting that the participation of commercial banks in the securities
business was viewed by many as a precipitating factor in the 1929 stock market crash).
208. See ICI,401 U.S. at 630-31 (discussing the legislative history of the Glass-Steagall
Act and noting that congressional legislators in the early 1930s feared that if banks were
allowed to affiliate with investment firms, the "pressure to sell a particular investment and
to make the affiliate successful might create a risk" that banks would engage in
impermissible and unsound self-dealing practices); see also 75 Cong. Rec. 9912 (1931)
(Remarks of Sen. Bulkley) ("[T]he promotional needs of investment banking might lead
commercial banks to lend their reputation.., to the enterprise of selling particular stocks
and securities .... [T]here can be no doubt that the whole transaction tends to discredit
the bank and impair the confidence of its depositors.").
209. See generallyHUGHES & CAIN, supra note 207 ("Modem research fails to reveal
any evidence that the 1929 crash or the ensuing depression had been aggravated by the
relationship [between commercial and investment banking.]"). Accord HERMAN, supra
note 121, at 12 (stating that while the 1929 stock market crash and the depression that
followed revealed abuses the system of securities trading, only a few were "related to the
linkage of banks and investment banking affiliates").
210. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
211. See id.
212. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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theory, the UTC gives the settlor the power to impose or relieve
almost any conditions or restrictions 14 Yet, in practice, the
aforementioned need for the expertise of corporate trustees casts
doubt on the extent of the voluntariness of the settlor's inclusion of a
self-dealing power in the trust instrument. The UTC's approach
presumes that the settlor would be able to choose not to allow his
trustee to self-deal once the ban is lifted. Some trust companies with
investment firm affiliates already require a provision granting them
the power to self-deal in the trust instrument.215 A legal sanction of
these presently forbidden transactions is unlikely to lessen the
corporate trustee's insistence on such a clause. As the trust arms of
large financial institutions become the predominant provider of trust
services, 216 settlors in North Carolina who desire a corporate trustee
may have no choice but to grant that trustee the power to self-deal.
In a recent law review article, 217 Professor Charles Bryan Baron
claims that allowing the terms of the trust to control promotes judicial
economy. He asserts that upholding the terms of the trust, while
superimposing a general duty of good faith and fair dealing on the
trustee, is a more effective and efficient use of judicial resources. 218
To illustrate his argument, Baron cites the Texas case of Interfirst
Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Risser.1 9 In that case, the corporate trustee,
Interfirst, sold trust property to one of its debtors, Southwest Pump
Company (Southwest), at well below market price. 220 Southwest then
resold the property to one of its shareholders. 22' This sale enabled the
shareholder to retain control of Southwest, thereby ensuring that
Southwest would be able to repay the loans owed to Interfirst.2
Although the transaction between Interfirst and Southwest did not
meet the strict statutory requirements for self-dealing, the Texas
213. See UNIF. TRUSTS CODE § 104(b) (2000).
214. See id. There are a few items that the terms of the trust may not alter. For
example, the terms may not alter the requirements for creating the trust (§ 104(b)(1)), the
requirement that the trust and its administration be for the benefit of the trust's
beneficiaries (§ 104(b)(3)), or the requirement that the trustee keep the qualified
beneficiaries reasonably informed (§ 104(b)(7)).
215. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
217. See Charles Bryan Baron, Self-Dealing Trustees and the Exoneration Clause: Can
Trustees Ever ProfitFrom TransactionsInvolving Trust Property?,72 ST. JOHN's L. REV.,
43,79-80 (1998).
218. See id. at 80.
219. 739 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App. 1987).
220. See id. at 895.
221. See id. at 887.
222. See id. at 896.
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Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's determination that the
transaction involved self-dealing?2
Baron states that by extending the definition of self-dealing to
transactions outside those specified in the statute, the court in
Interfirst rendered the term "superfluous and meaningless." 4 He
claims that since the transaction at issue was technically outside the
scope of the statutory prohibition, the court relied on Interfirst's bad
faith to bring the trustee's actions within those prohibited by the
statute.
In doing so, Baron concludes that the Interfirst court
"transformed the analysis of non-statutory self-dealing into a
befuddled good-faith analysis as opposed to a self-dealing analysis." 226
This approach wastes judicial resources by forcing courts to consider
the fairness of transactions which fall outside the statutory definition
of self-dealing. 2 7
Baron seems to imply that the presence of a good faith standard,
when the trust instrument permits self-dealing, would lead to less
litigation than a statutory prohibition that precludes the trust from
giving the trustee the power to self-deal. Examining three different
situations in light of the two alternatives demonstrates the weakness
of this proposition. First, consider a transaction in which the trustee
buys property for itself directly from the trust. Under a statutory
prohibition against self-dealing, the transaction is clearly illegal; the
only issue before the court would involve damages. But without a
statutory prohibition, the court must consider evidence concerning
whether the trustee acted in good faith. Consequently, a statutory
prohibition conserves judicial resources in this context.M
Next, consider a scenario where the trustee enters into a
transaction that is clearly not self-dealing yet appears to have been a
223. See id. at 899-900. Section 113.053 of the Texas Property Code defined a
prohibited self-dealing transaction as one in which the trustee bought or sold trust
property from or to itself. Because the court did not characterize Southwest as a business
associate of Interfirst, the transaction technically did not involve self-dealing. The court
found, however, that the circumstances surrounding the sale and Interfirst's improper
motive were sufficient to support the jury's determination that Interfirst had engaged in
illegal self-dealing. See id. at 899. Additionally, the court found the evidence sufficient to
support the conclusion that Interfirst had acted in bad faith in making the sale to
Southwest, which also constituted a breach of its fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries. See id.

at 905.
224. Baron, supra note 217, at 79.

225. See id.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 80.
228. One might also argue that the statutory prohibition discourages suits by assuring
the self-dealer of the outcome and thereby encouraging settlement.
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bad deal for the beneficiaries. The prohibition is not implicated, and
the court would employ whatever standard the jurisdiction dictates
for evaluating investment decisions. Judicial resources would be
neither conserved nor wasted, notwithstanding the existence of a selfdealing statute.
Finally, consider a situation similar to the Interfirst case, which is
technically outside the statutory prohibition but clearly tainted by a
self-dealing motive. In a jurisdiction which prohibits self-dealing by
statute, the court may either refuse to invoke the statute and look to
other grounds, such as fairness and good faith, for finding liability,229
or it may expand the statutory definition of self-dealing to include the
transaction3 0 If the court looks to other grounds, it mimics the work
undertaken by the court whose jurisdiction has no statute prohibiting
the transaction. If, instead, the court enlarges the statutory definition,
then while it is possible that it must use more judicial resources
initially, presumably trustees will avoid the conduct that the court
ruled unlawful, thus preserving future resources.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the enforcement of a
statutory prohibition on self-dealing will not result in the increased
use of judicial resources13
An approach that calls for a
229. This is the course chosen by the Interfirst court. See supra notes 223-26 and
accompanying text.
230. Baron suggests that a court is incapable of expanding the statutory definition. See
Baron, supra note 217, at 80. In fact, the opposite is true. Courts often construe statutes
either more or less broadly than their language would suggest is appropriate. See Maxwell
0. Chibundu, Structure and Structuralism in the Interpretationof Statutes, 62 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1139, 1140-41 (1994) (describing the Third Circuit's "revisionist" interpretation of
federal securities laws); Carlos J. Cuevas, Public Values and the Bankruptcy Code, 12
BANK. DEV. J. 645, 646 (1996) (claiming that the United States Supreme Court has
occasionally altered its interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code to achieve "the right
result"); Mark J. Garwin, M.D., Immunity in the Absence of Charity: EMTALA and the
Eleventh Amendment, 23 S. ILL. U. UJ. 1, 4 (1998) (claiming that overly broad judicial
interpretations of EMTALA have often extended the Act well beyond its original
purpose); Laurie L. Levenson, Good FaithDefenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 411 n.61 (1993) (calling the Ninth Circuit's allowance of a defense
not provided for by statute a "surprising display of judicial activism"). Tays v. Metier, No.
97-2317, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4769 (10th Cir. March 19, 1999), and Interfirst Bank
Dallas, N.A v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App. 1987), are two cases that illustrate the
wide possibilities of outcomes when courts consider statutes prohibiting trustee selfdealing. See supra note 164 (explaining the Tays court's finding of no liability for a selfdealing trustee); supra note 223 (explaining the Interfirst court's expansive treatment of
Texas' self-dealing prohibition).
231. A comparison of the amount of appellate case law addressing the self-dealing
issue in "good faith" jurisdictions and that in North Carolina, Nevada, and New Mexico
reveals far fewer appellate cases in North Carolina. See supra note 162 and accompanying
text (describing the Tenth Circuit's difficulty in finding applicable case law in New
Mexico-a statutory prohibition state).
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determination of the trustee's intent in every case is more wasteful

than one that quickly dispenses with the issue in at least some cases.
Thus, contrary to Professor Baron's conclusion, the good faith
standard tends to "produce litigation," 32 not a statutory ban on
trustee self-dealing.

Trustee self-dealing may allow the trust to avoid some costs that
would otherwise attend certain transactions and to pass the savings on
to the trustP 3 On the other hand, the benefits reaped by the trustee

as a result of the self-dealing may not be as detectable.

4

Additionally, the added cost to the beneficiaries, in terms of time and

money, of scrutinizing self-dealing transactions for an "unfair" or
"imprudent" amount of trustee self-interest may be greater than any
savings on fees 35 Ultimately, North Carolina beneficiaries may be
better off paying the higher but clearly disclosed fees to third parties
and retaining their trustee's undivided loyalty.

Some commentators argue that the UTC's reliance on the
prudent investor standard 1 6 and the duty of good faith1 7 is sufficient

to protect the interests of beneficiaries from harm due to trustee selfdealing. Professor Baron, for example, claims that if the transaction
is one that is reasonable to a prudent investor, and if the terms are
such that the transaction is fair to the beneficiaries, then the identity
of the party with whom the trust is dealing is irrelevant.

8

If the

trustee fails to meet either of these standards, the beneficiaries have a

232. Gordon v. Finlay, 10 N.C. 239,242 (1824).
233. For example, by dealing with affiliates, corporate trustees may be able to employ
economies of scale to reduce certain fixed costs.
234. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in
ascertaining the benefit to the trustee and the resulting detriment to the beneficiaries from
any particular self-dealing transaction).
235. See infra notes 236-41 and accompanying text (discussing the protective
capabilities of the fairness and prudent investor standards as applied to self-dealing
transactions).
236. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACt § 2, 7B U.L.A. 62 (1985) (Supp. 1999)
(requiring the trustee to manage the trust as a prudent investor would). See UNW. TRUST
CODE cmt. (Interim Draft, Oct. 1999). The Uniform Prudent Investor Act enlarges the
common law scope of permissible investment activities in which the trustee may engage.
See Why States Should Adopt... The Uniform PrudentInvestor Act (visited September 1,
2000) <http://www.nccusl.orgluniformactLwhy/uniformacts-why-upia.htm>.
For a
practical guide to the Prudent Investor Act and its impact on trust management, see
TRAIN & MELFE, supra note 14, at 25-34.
237. See UNiF. TRUST CODE § 801 (2000); supra note 135 and accompanying text
(discussing the trustee's duty to exercise its powers in good faith).
238. See Baron, supra note 217, at 80. But see Scott, supra note 111, at 544 (arguing
that allowing trustee self-dealing under any circumstances is dangerous for the
beneficiaries).
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cause of action even in the absence of trustee self-dealing23' 9 This
argument assumes that the beneficiaries have the expertise to
determine whether an investment scheme is prudent; it also presumes
that a bad faith transaction is readily apparent. 240 Unfortunately,
there is no guarantee that either of these presumptions will be true.
Presuming that the UTC is widely accepted, adopting the UTC
could bring North Carolina law into uniformity with the majority of
states.241 Jurisdictions without a statute prohibiting the settlor from
granting the power to self-deal, however, treat trust clauses that
exonerate the trustee from liability in varying ways. 242 In states that
expressly permit trustee exoneration clauses, the courts have
attempted to erect some safeguards for the settlor and beneficiaries
by holding that a broad statement of release from liability is
insufficient to establish that the settlor intended to allow the trustee
to self-deal.243 Permission to self-deal must be given in "clear and
unmistakable language" in order to relieve the trustee from
liability.244 Additionally, even if the trust instrument permits selfdealing, the courts in these states insist that the trustee must still
239. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACr, § 2, 7B U.L.A. 62, 1985 (Supp. 1999)
(prudent investor rule); UNF. TRUST CODE § 801 (2000) (duty to administer the trust in
good faith).
240. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (discussing the hidden dangers of
trustee self-dealing to beneficiaries).
241. Only six states, including North Carolina, adopted the 1937 Uniform Trust Act.
The six states are listed as follows: Louisiana (codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1725,
9:2062, 9:2063, 9:2065, 9:2084-9:2086, 9:2112, 9:2114, 9:2122, 9:2124-9:2126, 9:2196, 9:2207,
and 9:2208 (West 1991)); Nevada (codified as NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.010-163.210
(Michie 1997)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46-2-1 to 46-2-19 (Michie 1997 Supp.));
North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-60 to 36A-84 (1999)); Oklahoma (codified as

OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.1-.23 (1994)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-4-1 to
55-4-36 (Michie 1997)). Of those statutes, all but North Carolina, Nevada, and New
Mexico modified the legislation to allow the settlor to relieve the trustee of the selfdealing restriction through express language in the trust instrument. Texas, which did not
adopt the UTA, nevertheless has implemented a statute that prohibits the settlor from
permitting trustee self-dealing. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.059(b) (West 1995)
(stating that the settlor may not "relieve a corporate trustee from the duties, restrictions,
or liabilities of... Section ... 113.053 [which prohibits the trustee's sale or purchase of
property to or from the trust] of this Act"). The rule has been expanded by courts to
prohibit transactions in which, while not buying or selling property from or to itself or
affiliate in the strict sense, the trustee gains significant benefit from the transaction. See
Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A., v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 898-99 (Tex. App. 1987) (holding
that a sale by the trustee of trust property at less than market value to another corporation

so that the buyer might repay debt to the trustee corporation was self-dealing for purposes
of the statute).
242. See Baron, supra note 217, at 72-73.
243. See, e.g., In re Anneke's Trust, 38 N.W.2d 177, 183 (Minn. 1949).
244. Id. at 183.
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adhere to a standard of good faith and fairness to the beneficiaries.245
Among the many jurisdictions whose statutes are silent as to the
ability of the settlor to exonerate the trustee, the rule of law is not
clear. 46 However, at least some courts have upheld the clause as an
expression of the settlor's intent?47 The UTC aims to replace this
inconsistent case law with a uniform body of statutory law that will
offer the settlor the opportunity to allow his trustee to self-deal.2 As
expressed earlier, the uniformity of the UTC depends upon the extent
to which state legislatures adopt the model legislation. Therefore, as
with its adoption of the UTA,2 4 9 North Carolina's adoption of the
UTC does not guarantee uniformity with the rest of the nation
because a significant number of states may not enact the UTC.
Further, if the UTC is adopted by the North Carolina legislature,
the new statutes essentially result in a return to the common law rules
in place prior to the adoption of the UTA, but worse. A trust
provision, giving the trustee the power to self-deal continuously
without the consent of either the beneficiaries or the court, does not
appear to have been contemplated by North Carolina's common law
as an appropriate method of relieving the trustee from liability. 0
CONCLUSION

As North Carolina enters the Age of the Investor,2 1 the state
must respond to the financial needs of its citizens but still maintain
safeguards for those individuals who must rely on the professional
skills of others2 2 For good reason the trust law has been slow to
change. The concerns about trustee self-dealing raised as early as
1824253 are still valid. Rather than toss out almost two hundred years
of reasoned jurisprudence in favor of the forthcoming UTC, the
245. See, e.g., Renz v. Beeman, 589 F.2d 735,744-45 (2d Cir. 1978).
246. See Baron, supra note 217, at 57-73 (explaining that the legal effect of exoneration
clauses varies by jurisdiction and can be influenced by factors other than the trust
language).
247. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 217, at 68-72 (describing differing approaches to the
judicial construction of self-dealing clauses).
248. See supranotes 132-41 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 241.
250. An extensive search of pre-1939 appellate case law has not yielded a single case
that suggests allowing self-dealing without the consent of the beneficiaries or the court was
appropriate.
251. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
252. See HERMAN, supra note 121, at 14; SHENKMAN, supranote 93, at 7.
253. See Gordon v. Finlay, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 239, 242 (1824) ("Lead us not into
temptation .... To make exceptions from the rule in particular cases [because] full value
was paid, would produce litigation; and who is there to show full value?").
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North Carolina legislature should consider the trust beneficiaries,
who will be affected directly, and state residents who rely on fiduciary
relationships. Because the trustee/beneficiary relationship has been
the paradigm for all other fiduciary relationships, relaxing the ban on
trustee self-dealing may diminish fiduciary duties in other contexts.
The first issue to consider is whether North Carolina needs to
change its law at all. As discussed previously, there are good reasons
for keeping the self-dealing ban in place. However, an apparent
misunderstanding among settlors, beneficiaries, and trustees about
the ability of a settlor to grant her trustee the power to self-deal is
preventing the law from protecting those who should benefit from it:
instead, the threat of future liability for trustees and the potential for
a court to apply the law incorrectly214 hang over trustees and
beneficiaries alike. Ideally, North Carolina should keep the ban, reenergize it with a current legislative statement of purpose or
resolution, and educate practitioners and the public about the
illegality of trustee self-dealing.
If the state is unwilling to enforce the ban, then it should be
repealed. A wholesale adoption of the UTC, however, is not the only
option. As discussed earlier, the most dangerous part of the UTC for
beneficiaries is the provision that allows the settlor to give the trustee
permission to self-deal in the trust instrument. If that provision was
left out of North Carolina's codification, trustees could obtain
permission to self-deal without going to court, but only with the
informed consent of the beneficiaries. Also, the beneficiaries could
revoke that consent if the situation deteriorated, thus restoring some
of the balance of power between the beneficiaries and their trustee.
This option is a preferable and more logical solution to the problem
of the self-dealing ban.
North Carolina should reject the UTC's approach.
The
suggestion that the change would benefit the settlor, by giving effect
to his intent,' 5 is reasonable only if one supposes that the settlor
intended that his trustee be allowed to use the trust for its own
advantage, rather than for that of his beneficiariesl 6 Likewise, no
254. See supra notes 152-87 and accompanying text (discussing Tays v. Metier, No. 972317, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4769, at *1, (10th Cir. March 19, 1999)).
255. See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text (detailing the argument that
allowing the settlor to permit self-dealing through express language in the trust instrument
gives effect to the settlor's intent, thereby upholding one of the underlying objectives of

trust law).
256. See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text (suggesting that the inclusion of a
provision granting the trustee the power to deal with its affiliated securities dealer is
indicative only of the settlor's desire to use a corporate trustee and not of a desire to allow
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real benefit to the beneficiaries has been demonstrated,257 yet the

potential for injury to their interests is clear

8

The only party who

would unquestionably benefit from the change is the corporate

trustee. Thus, the real question that the ultimate fate of section 36A66 of the North Carolina General Statutes will answer is whether

North Carolina believes that the benefit of increased profits for
corporate trustees outweighs the potential harm to North Carolina

beneficiaries.
Trust law has the following two objectives:295

(1) to allow the

settlor the power to distribute his property as he wishes260 and (2) to

protect the corpus of the trust.261 Every addition or modification to
that body of law should be evaluated in light of those two objectives.
The UTC's approach to trustee self-dealing does not promote either
of them. While arguably neutral with regard to the settlor's intent,262
it certainly undermines the beneficiaries' ability to detect and remedy
trustee misconduct.m
Historically, the fiduciary relationship between a trustee and the
beneficiary has served as a classic example of the standard of strict
his trustee to engage in self-dealing); supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text
(discussing some of the ways in which a self-dealing trustee could use the trust for its own
benefit while still not violating the UTC's fairness and prudent investor standards).
257. One might argue that by allowing the beneficiaries themselves to permit selfdealing transactions after full-disclosure, the beneficiaries benefit by the increased
availability of investment options. This argument can be answered in two ways. First,
North Carolina statutes allow the beneficiaries to relieve the trustee from liability for past
violations of the self-dealing ban. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-79 (1999); supra notes 74,
142 (discussing the meaning and intent of that statute). Thus, if the transaction is
beneficial to the beneficiaries, they may ratify it after the fact. The beneficiaries are then
afforded some protection against trustee self-interest while still retaining the ability to
benefit from any special investment opportunity available exclusively from the trustee.
Second, the trustee may petition for court approval of any such transaction. See Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 716-17, 153 S.E.2d 44.9, 461 (1967) (holding
that the court may grant approval for prohibited self-dealing if certain criteria are met);
see also supranotes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria which the trustee
must satisfy in order to obtain court approval). The beneficiaries' desire to enter into the
transaction will certainly be considered by the court in determining whether the deal
should be allowed.
258. See supra notes 235-41, infra notes 272-75 and accompanying text (discussing the
potential harm to beneficiaries inherent in trustee self-dealing).
259. See Lichtenfels v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 268 N.C. 467, 477, 151 S.E.2d 78, 84
(1966).
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text (discussing the self-dealing ban and
the settlor's intent).
263. See supra notes 122-27, 233-36 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty
beneficiaries have in detecting and proving detrimental self-dealing).

2000

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

loyalty.2 4 The UTC's approach, while purporting to include a duty of
loyalty.265 transforms that historical duty from one of "punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive""z to one grounded in advantage and profit.
If North Carolina accepts that characterization of the trustee's duty of
loyalty by adopting the UTC, it will devastate the state's longstanding
conception of a fiduciary relationship. Unfortunately for North
whose only standards
Carolina citizens, the result will be 2fiduciaries
67
are the "morals of the marketplace.
North Carolina must not yield to pressure from corporate
trustees or the NCCUSL to repeal its self-dealing ban and replace it
with the UTC. Instead, the state should remind trustees, lawyers, and
beneficiaries of its existence and of the limitations the ban places on
trustees. The office of trustee is vested with the duty to tend solely to
the interests of the beneficiaries. The purpose of the self-dealing
prohibition is to remove from the trustee all temptation to act in the
interest of any other than its beneficiaries and to thereby prevent
fraud 2 6 The moment the trustee, through its affiliate, enters into a
transaction with the trust for the express purpose of making a profit
for itself, the trustee is necessarily acting in its own interest.269 Merely
imposing the nebulous standards of "good faith" and "prudent"
investing is insufficient protection for beneficiaries against a selfdealing trustee. Beneficiaries may have little or no opportunity in
some transactions to assess the extent to which their interests may
have been ignored in favor of the trustee's. The fact that the
particular transaction may not prove injurious to the beneficiaries is
irrelevant 70 No longer are the beneficiaries' interests the trustee's
sole concern.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Tays v. Metlei271 is especially
troublesome. Although unpublished, and thus nonbinding, its
holding is a radical departure from the plain meaning of the text of
the statute and the communicated legislative intent. Because
264. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928).

265. See UNiF.

TRusT CODE

§ 802(a) (2000).

266. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
267. 1l
268. See supranotes 61-64 (explaining the court's motivation for the rule).
269. Of course, the argument may be made that the mere act of serving as a trustee for
pay is self-interested; this argument glosses over the fact that the trustee is being paid to
administer the trust for the best interests of the beneficiaries and that such pay is intended
to be the total benefit accruing to the trustee by virtue of his relationship to the trust.
270. The fact that a security is bought or sold at market price does not mean that no
harm has been done the beneficiaries. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
271. No. 97-2317, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4769 (10th Cir. Mar. 19, 1999); supra notes
152-61 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of the case).
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beneficiaries must look to the judiciary to remedy a trustee's violation
of the protections intended by the North Carolina General Assembly,
a court's unwillingness to enforce the statutes as they are written
could render the legislative process moot. The flawed reasoning in
Tays must be rejected by the North Carolina state courts and the
courts in the other 1937 UTA jurisdictions.
The current economic climate, while producing a more savvy,
less risk-averse investing public, nevertheless supports keeping and
enforcing the self-dealing ban and rejecting the UTC's approach. The
information explosion seen in recent years merely offers beneficiaries
the opportunity to evaluate any particular transaction in light of the
good faith and prudent investor standards included in the new
UTC.272 Access to market information does not include access to the
private motivations of the trustee.2 73 Without that, the beneficiaries
cannot protect themselves if "the shepherd... become[s] a wolf." 274
This Comment submits that North Carolina should retain and
enforce its existing prohibition on trustee self-dealing. If not, it
should at least prevent the settlor from relieving the trustee from
liability for self-dealing transactions. By doing so, North Carolina will
preserve the integrity of the fiduciary duty, protect its beneficiaries,
and conserve judicial resources.
ELIZABETH T. MEHAFFEY

272. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
274. Baron, supranote 217, at 78.
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